




‘Filip’ or Flop? Managing Public Relations and the Latin American Reaction to the 1966 FIFA World Cup 

Abstract




The 1966 FIFA World Cup has been analysed from a variety of perspectives including management history, project management, entrepreneurship, its impact on club football, the local identity of host cities, and cultural significance.​[1]​ A point raised by many such studies is that the tournament received public subsidy with the objective of creating ‘a lasting reminder’, according to ‘Minister for Sport’ Denis Howell.  British politicians believed that 1966 provided an opportunity to put the UK and its national plan in the shop window.  Hosting the World Cup would be a ‘filip’ to British image abroad at a time of relative decline and decolonisation, thus showcasing the country and the Wilson Government’s national plan for renewal.​[2]​
	An example of a positive reaction abroad was in the USA, where the World Cup Final was broadcast on television, catching the imagination of viewers as well as sports entrepreneurs. The 1966 World Cup Final stimulated the popularity of soccer in the USA and also in Canada, after the game’s audience had waned as other ‘home grown’ sports dominated through the 1950s. This arguably helped to catalyse the North American Soccer League (NASL) and later the Major Indoor Soccer League (MISL) in which star players from the 1966 World Cup would later feature.​[3]​  As we will show, a positive reaction was also evident in El Salvador.  However, despite a long history of British influence, in the South American nations there was negative press.
	In this paper we explore and analyse the way in which the tournament was reported and perceived in Latin America, where there were allegations that FIFA, the FA and even the UK government manipulated the tournament to the advantage of England and other European teams. Latin America is a term used to describe countries originally colonized by France, Spain, and Portugal, and where their language and culture are similar.  Latin America overlaps the geographic north-south America divide as it is used to describe countries from Mexico southwards.​[4]​
Our historical analysis provides insight as to how the tournament’s organisers reacted to these allegations and how they attempted to manage the situation.  We focus on English language sources generated within the UK itself and by its diplomats, interpreting files compiled by the British Government’s Foreign Office at the time of the crisis, now held in The National Archives at Kew in London, augmented by some newspaper and periodical sources. These sources are appropriate within the context of our study because we focus on Britain’s surprise and concern at its loss of influence in Latin America, once considered part of Britain’s ‘informal empire’, rather than the reaction to the claims in Latin American countries.

Soccer and Informal Empire 
Historians have pointed to the influence of British informal imperialism in globalising soccer through the early twentieth century.​[5]​ This concept has remained somewhat nebulous in the sport history literature but a useful insight can be gained from the fields of imperial history and a corpus of related work in business history.  The countries of Latin America were settled by the French, Spanish, and Portuguese in the sixteenth century, but by the mid-nineteenth century most had become independent of European powers. Theory of informal empire is situated at the peak of British political and economic power in the late 19th and early 20th Century, and the British played an important role in capital formation throughout the continent.​[6]​  However, the British lost macroeconomic strength as they struggled to restore the Gold Standard after the First World War, and from the 1920s onwards informal empire began to weaken, as American economic and political influence in the region grew, cemented by Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbour Policy’,​[7]​ and local governments asserted themselves increasingly in the economic sphere.​[8]​ This pattern of development gradually displaced British businesses in Latin America, as they were sold, competed out, nationalised or expropriated, while British trade policy came to favour trade links with the formal Empire and Commonwealth, weakening British links to the region.​[9]​  Less is known about the extent to which this decline is reflected through attitudes in the post war period, especially regarding sport and the way it is reported.
British companies, often in the form of ‘free-standing companies’, built a trading and commercial network that encouraged economic development in Latin America.​[10]​ The pamplomas of Argentina and Uruguay offered opportunities for large-scale cattle farming as British agricultural productivity failed to satisfy the requirements of the domestic market, leading to the growth of British domiciled mercantile companies such as Liebig’s Extract of Meat, which through its Uruguayan operations originated the iconic Oxo and Fray Bentos consumer food brands.​[11]​  Uruguayan ‘bully beef’ from Fray Bentos would become a staple military ration during World War 2, still a recent memory in 1966.​[12]​ British companies also constructed, owned and operated most of the Argentinian railway system, nationalised in 1947, as well as substantial systems in Cuba, Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile. ​[13]​  The mountains of Peru and Chile provided opportunities for British copper and nitrate mining companies.​[14]​   British firms also participated in the rubber trade of the deep Amazon basin in Brazil, Peru and Bolivia.​[15]​ By 1900 the increasing urbanization of cities throughout Latin America opened up opportunities for the provision of urban utilities including gas, water, electricity and tramway services, though even British diplomats were said to have complained of the poor service offered by many of these companies.​[16]​ This activity has sometimes been characterised as informal empire, to the extent that Argentina was referred to as the ‘sixth dominion’ in the 1932 Ottawa Agreement on imperial trade, and given preferential treatment over other non-Empire or Commonwealth countries.​[17]​  Between the 1930s and the 1970s, the status of these firms was increasingly challenged as Latin American governments increasingly attempted to assert economic independence. But the region remained of interest to British businessmen, epitomised by the English language business journal The Review of the River Plate which ran from 1892, at the height of British economic dominance, until 1995.​[18]​
	Business links did not necessarily reduce cultural distance between Britain and Latin America.  British, and more generally European views of the tropics had been influenced by a typification of the broad tropical zone from Asia to the Americas as an exotic scene to be viewed, which also held a fascination for its apparently very productive natural environment which contrasted with the apparent unproductivity of its native people.  This dichotomy was used to justify the exploitation of people and places, and the forced circulation of tropical plants and people around the world as part of the rationalization of empire.​[19]​ While not all of Latin America fell within the tropical zone, the critical historiography of Mignolo and Martin, similarly demonstes the creation of Latin America as an easily typified liminal space out with Europe yet defined from a European perspective.  Mignolo suggests that Latin Americans, as European emigrants who had adopted a ‘Latinidad’ cultural identity, were perceived to have a culture yet lack civilization; they were a form of second class European.​[20]​  Again, this contributes to a sense of familiarity yet denotes othering and distancing.  This typified view of the tropics as an exotified picture was reflected in works of fiction, such as Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Return of Sherlock Homes, in which a Brazilian murder victim was described as, ‘a creature of the tropics….tropical by birth, tropical by nature. A child of the sun, and of passion.​[21]​’  Most British citizens had little access to travel, and museums and institutions, designed to showcase Empire, such as the Botanic Gardens at Kew in London reinforced the image by presenting plants from the tropics of Asia, Africa, the Americas and the Pacific together.​[22]​ The exotic ‘Latinidad’ image persisted – published between 1953 and 1966, James Bond novels set a range of storylines including several situated in the French and Spanish speaking Caribbean islands.  These books, later turned into films, portrayed a glamorous, mysterious and dangerous world populated by larger-than-life gangsters, businessmen, voodoo magic, and various national/racial stereotypes.​[23]​  Around the same time British local newspapers featured a syndicated cartoon from Denmark titled ‘Alfredo’, featuring a hot blooded and crafty but often hapless man with black hair and a pointed moustache, who was shown in a range of roles with themes of womanising or being deferential to corrupt and incompetent authority, and frequently wearing a uniform similar to that of a Carabinier.​[24]​
	

Soccer in Latin America
Since the Victorian and Edwardian eras British clubs toured in Latin America, and players, coaches and referees migrated there.  The basis for this is contested, with Mason identifying the British as the major driving force for the establishment of the sport in Latin America, though Brown contests this on the basis that Mason’s analysis of the earliest period focuses only on Argentina.​[25]​ Specific detail as to the nature of a process of cultural influence on Latin Americans’ adoption of association football is difficult to find, but it appears that soccer presented one of the few real portals for interaction between Europe and Latin America, after nationalist governments asserted economic control over formerly British owned assets.  Starting in the inter-war years Latin American governments lobbied for greater influence over the governance of world football, particularly through FIFA’s committees. This encouraged European associations to ‘self-integrate’, to form the European Confederation UEFA in the early 1950s. South American associations, themselves formed around 1900, had long been collaborating, forming the first continental confederation, CONEMBOL in 1916.  This enabled South American associations to block vote at FIFA Congresses, frustrating European attempts to maintain control over the game.​[26]​
South American football was therefore successful on and off the pitch from a relatively early stage in the history of the sport, perhaps best exemplified by the success of the Uruguayan national team at the 1924 and 1928 Summer Olympics.  The 1928 final also featured Argentina, meaning that in the 1920s three of the six medal winning teams were from Latin America, and three from Europe.  Uruguay’s success culminated in the hosting rights for the first edition of FIFA’s new competition, the World Cup. Thereafter, until 1994 when it was held in the USA, the World Cup was held in Latin America and Europe almost equally (8 times in Europe, 6 times in Latin America).  
The first World Cup final was contested between Uruguay and Argentina in 1930 (won 4-2 by the former). The fourth, hosted by Brazil in 1950, again featured an all Latin American final, Uruguay triumphing 2-1 over the hosts in front of an attendance of almost 200,000 people, at the Maracanã stadium, built for the tournament and then the largest stadium in the world. 1950 marked the first appearance by the English team, after a self-imposed 17-year exile from FIFA ended in 1948.  England failed to qualify from the group stages but participating marked England’s re-integration with world football.​[27]​  At this time two key administrators at the English FA, the Secretary Sir Stanley Rous and England selector Arthur Drewry, both of whom would later serve as FIFA Presidents, had pushed for England to re-join FIFA.  As English football was ending its isolation the Brazilian national team with its expressive style of play was emerging. In 1958 one of its stars, Pelé, aged 17 years, became the youngest player to appear in a World Cup final.  He scored two goals against Sweden to help Brazil win the tournament, and became the best rated player in the world prior to the 1962 World Cup.  Pelé would go on to figure in two further World Cups, 1966 and 1970, before helping to spearhead the North American Soccer League (NASL) in the mid-1970s, and was ultimately named FIFA Player of the Century in 2000.




The 1966 FIFA World Cup: A ‘Filip’ for Britain Abroad?
Domestically, the tournament was a successful enterprise for the British and its government, although we will explain that it was not universally successful in building Britain’s image abroad, particularly in Latin America.​[30]​  This is important because, as we have already explained, there was a heritage of economic and social ties with Latin American countries stretching back to at least the mid-nineteenth century, but which were loosening by the 1960s.  It is these ties rather than overt political ties to which we refer in this paper and the British Diplomatic Service retained a strong presence in Latin America, closely monitoring perceptions of British prestige there from its UK base in Whitehall.  The diplomats recorded their personal observations as well as monitoring local media and commercial networks, including evidence of Latin American responses to the 1966 FIFA World Cup.  This provides a valuable perspective on how the tournament was perceived and experienced outside of England, to enhance understanding of the tournament’s impact on Britain’s image beyond Europe.  
The 1966 FIFA World Cup was the last to occur before satellite television broadcasting became widespread.  This restricted live broadcasting to Latin American countries to radio commentary, while TV pictures were made available a few days later and physically exported from England. In Argentina and Brazil radio broadcasters carried live matches from England, and television broadcasters in both countries showed recordings of all 32 matches when they arrived by air a few days after.​[31]​  Broadcasters in Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela showed at least some recorded matches too.  Therefore, the perceptions of Latin Americans tended to be shaped by newspapers and audio (specifically the live radio commentary, provided by ‘local’ broadcasters who had flown to England) rather than visual experience. We now discuss the British Diplomatic Service’s reflections as to how the tournament was reported and the reactions of Latin Americans to what they experienced.
	There was organizational confusion about the visit of eighty-eight Mexican supporters who arrived on a tour organized by a company calling itself the Anglo-South American Travel Service Ltd., which promised a full package of ‘First Class’ accommodation, tickets, transport and guides for twenty days in London.  Chaos ensued when the hotels were not considered by supporters to be as luxurious as promised; e.g. many fans had been promised en-suite bathrooms but found that they had to share with others.  The visitors protested to the Mexican embassy in London that something should be done, triggering a row firstly between the Mexican embassy and Anglo-South American when the Mexican Consul visited the hotels and agreed that they were of poor standard.  These stories reached the Mexican press, who reported that Anglo-South American had defrauded the visitors, and awoke the interest of the British Foreign Office, which asked the Association of British Travel Agencies to intervene.  They agreed that the hotels were ‘third class’, and pressured Anglo South American to move the Mexicans to new hotels.  But this row left a bad taste, and in early August the Mexican press alleged that “Scotland Yard” had arrested the entire party for robbery, though both the police and Mexican Embassy were quick to announce that they knew of no such charges or arrests.​[32]​
Elsewhere, the press response to England’s win included allegations that the FIFA, the FA and even the UK government had manipulated the tournament to the advantage of European teams and particularly England’s.​[33]​The complaint in the press and the public mood in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay as well as in Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Peru were sufficient for the UK’s embassies there to report the reaction back to headquarters in London.​[34]​
A particular flashpoint occurred in the quarter-finals. There was anger throughout Latin America at the appointment of an English referee for the Uruguay-Germany quarter final, and a German referee, Rudolf Krietlein, for the Argentina-England quarter-final.  In an infamously stormy match, Krietlein sent off the Argentine captain Antonio Rattin, an incident that inspired English referee Ken Aston to suggest the introduction of red and yellow cards.​[35]​  Part of the problem was linguistic; the two teams and the referee had no language in common, and Rattin was unaware that he had been cautioned before Krietlein sent him off.​[36]​ When the England manager Alf Ramsey was interviewed after the match the press overemphasised the use of the word ‘animals’, fuelling the fire.  Subsequently, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aries reported that even ‘balanced’ newspapers in the country had viewed the referee’s appointment as part of a ‘blatant conspiracy’ to defraud South America of the cup. The embassy also received hate mail, some linking the incident to Britain’s ownership of the Falkland Islands, and ‘hundreds’ of abusive telephone calls.  Perhaps most symbolically for trade links, there was a violent incident involving the British stand at a trade show. These occurrences created concern that Britain’s image in Argentina, traditionally a British ally, had been damaged.​[37]​The response of The Review of the River Plate suggested a perception of further damage to British prestige in Argentina, drawing attention to the ‘hullabaloo’ surrounding the match, claiming it was as ‘unsportsmanlike as could be imagined’, and condemning the ‘increasing roughness’ of international matches.​[38]​  That this business journal which usually focused on macro-economic reporting mentioned the match at all, suggests that they feared an adverse impact upon British trade with South America, but also that they considered international football an undue distraction from business, the series having been given ‘excessive importance’ by tourist agencies and press commentators.  
The Foreign Office lent on Rous to deny the allegations of conspiracy. He condemned the incidents, whilst congratulating Brazil, Chile and Uruguay on their ‘sporting acceptance of defeat’. Yet he also threatened that Argentina would not be allowed to enter the 1970 tournament without giving certain ‘assurances’, and asserted that senior footballers should set an example to young people in accepting the decision of a referee as final.​[39]​ Diplomats feared that the ‘British’ nature of Rous’ response, which overtly stressed values of sportsmanship may have alienated the Argentines further.​[40]​The British Sports Minister, Denis Howell also wrote of his concern, with the status of the Falkland Islands in mind, not to allow the Argentinians to snub a British government reception held for teams eliminated at the quarter final stage; Uruguay, North Korea and Hungary arrived at the appointed time of 7pm, but the Argentines had to be persuaded to attend and did not appear until 10pm.​[41]​
The reaction to Brazil’s exit from the competition at the group stage also caused concern in the diplomatic service that Britain’s reputation for fair play and sportsmanship had been compromised.​[42]​ Brazil’s team, winners in 1958 and 1962, arrived in England hoping to continue their dominance, having been hyped up by Brazillian media, the Brazilian Sports Federation and their own team officials.​[43]​ They were unable to live up to these hopes - after beating Bulgaria 2-0, they lost 3-1 to both Hungary and Portugal.  Pelé, perhaps the most famous footballer in the world in 1966, had suffered injury against Bulgaria,and was then ‘kicked out’ of the World Cup as Portugal employed negative tactics, setting three players to man mark him. Pelé was forced to retire injured from the match after just 30 minutes play, while the English referee simply gave a free-kick.​[44]​ Pelé vowed never to play in another World Cup, and considered international retirement.​[45]​
The poor treatment of Pelé was the final straw for the Brazilian footballing establishment. João Havelange, then President of the Brazilian Football Confederation, was even said to be considering a protest to Rous and FIFA, and in his report on Brazil’s failure in the competition partly blamed the English organisers (contrastingly Pelé was heavily critical of the Brazilian Confederation’s technical commission’s preparations for the tournament).​[46]​ In both Argentina and Brazil, British diplomats considered having articles written locally in support of England’s hosting of the tournament,​[47]​ but it was considered that the best policy was to wait out the anger; that football fans would soon forget as the football world moved on.  Havelange’s anger did not subside as quickly as hoped; he wrote a column in the Rio daily newspaper Diario de Noticias on 26 August. He claimed that Rous, and FIFA had conspired to help UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson politically by providing him with a PR coup immediately after his difficult negotiations with President Johnson over the sterling (currency) crisis, which was making newspaper headlines at that time.  
Havelange further alleged that FIFA had appointed ‘political referees’ to deliberately take decisions against South American teams. He claimed the British had wanted Germany, the Soviet Union and Portugal to at least reach the semi-finals, with the motive of forging closer ties with Portugal in the hope of regaining its lost influence in Africa.Meanwhile Britain needed West Germany’s supportto join the [European] Common Market against the powerful opposition of France’s President de Gaulle, who had vetoed Britain’s entry in 1963, and to improve links with the Soviet Union to enable the bartering away of British products unsold because of weak home consumption.  Perhaps most outlandishly and even while conceding that Brazil’s team would probably only have been good enough to reach the quarter finals, Havelange claimed that the British had spread anti South American propaganda during a meeting on the International Coffee Agreement by claiming that caffeine, present in coffee, a principal export for many South American countries, had a true doping effect.​[48]​
By September diplomats remained so concerned at the damage to British prestige that when they received a request from a Brazilian trade union, for a shirt worn by one of the England players in the World Cup, they contacted the FA in the hope that such a gesture might improve Britain’s image.​[49]​  Denis Follows, the FA Secretary, was less than enthusiastic and suspicious of the trade union’s motives, fearing that the shirt might become an ‘object of abuse’ as well as worrying that there might be further requests, but he did reluctantly agree to donate a replica England shirt.​[50]​  Even as late as October, in the run-up to a meeting of the South American continental football congress at which it was feared there would be calls for a reform of FIFA, the British Embassy in Rio was reporting that ‘unpleasant digs’ at British sportsmanship were continuing to appear in Brazilian newspapers.​[51]​
Havelange would eventually be elected in Rous’ place as FIFA President in 1974; while there was no base to his allegations that the British had sought to manipulate the results of the tournament, the FIFA Refereeing Committee’s decision to appoint a number of English referees together with Rous’ poor handling of the row over the England v Argentina match, seems unfortunate and likely to have fuelled cultural misunderstanding.  There was a more significant misunderstanding in terms of the philosophy of soccer. Former England goalkeeper Gordon Banks argues that the referee, McCabe, was lenient towards the Portuguese because the British saw soccer asmore of a contact sport in the 1960s than the Brazilians.​[52]​
While the Foreign Office’s main concern before the tournament had been the participation of North Korea,​[53]​ perhaps more lasting damage had been done to Britain’s relations with Latin American countries, although the response was not uniformly negative.  Regrettably, and reflecting portrayals of Latin Americans in the British media, British diplomats claimed that they were ‘bad losers’.  One diplomat considered the press response in Argentina to be ‘emotional and irrational’, though there was also a sense that some in the Foreign Office still thought of Argentina in particular as an anglophile country. This was particularly reflected in one suggestion that an article on polo be placed into the press drawing particular attention to Argentine achievement in that sport.​[54]​
There was further controversy in Uruguay.  By 1966 the British press had largely forgotten Britain’s history of trade with the country and Uruguayans were reportedly mystified by the press’ lack of knowledge of their country. This lack of comprehension was reported in Uruguay, and even at the stage of the first game of the tournament the British mission in Montevideo received six abusive telephone calls. Controversial refereeing decisions taken by an English referee, Jim Finney, who sent off two Uruguayan players as the country lost 4-0 to West Germany in the Quarter-Finals, would cause an eruption of anti-English sentiment.  Matters were not helped by the simultaneous scheduling of this match with the other quarter-finals, including the Argentina-England match mentioned above. Following these matches the Ambassador’s Residence, the British Chancery and Consulate were bombarded with 300 phone calls and violent protests took place, resulting in local police having to post guards outside the Residence.  The local press, led by La Mariana, considered by British diplomats to be one of the ‘better produced newspapers’, turned against the British, accusing Rous of having paid the referees to favour England and West Germany, despite their earlier praise for the British mission’s supply of information for background features on the World Cup.  Only the showing of the television film of the match a couple of days later calmed matters although, like Havelange, the Uruguayian FA Vice-President was still writing articles in the press to the effect that ‘this Championship was prepared with great cleverness so as to ensure the English team the maximum number of advantages and the South American teams the maximum number of disadvantages.’  Worse, this was thought to count in Uruguay perhaps more than elsewhere because the route many politicians took to power was to be on the board of a football team.​[55]​
In the view of the Montevideo embassy staff the BBC had been the one British institution to emerge well from the tournament, the local radio stations sometimes re-broadcasting BBC coverage or features. In Peru, a country that had not qualified for the tournament, the BBC’s Spanish language commentator, apparently a Chilean, was criticised by a member of the British Embassy staff for his anti-European stance, particularly when Latin American teams got into trouble with the referees.​[56]​  Even there local fans had been angered by the apparent bias of FIFA referees against South American teams, particularly Argentina, although once again the arrival of TV pictures had tempered opinion somewhat. Hutchinson felt that the BBC’s reputation for accuracy had been a double edged sword in Peru – it had improved the UK’s image through features broadcast as background to the competition, but if the BBC reported that Argentina had been victim to prejudiced refereeing decisions, ‘then this must really have been the case’.  D. C. Chricton, the British Head of Chancery in Bolivia also reported on August 4 that the press and locals there had responded negatively too, alleging that Britain had ‘sold her honour for a gold cup’.​[57]​  Intriguingly, Crichton suggested that the Bolivian had been inspired by some critical accounts appearing in the British press, particularly the reports of John Rafferty in The Scotsman, although it does not seem surprising that a Scottish commentator would take a ‘critical’ view! 
Overall, the response was negative enough that on August 12 the Foreign Office had sent guidance to all British embassies and consulates in Latin America as well as in Italy, Spain and Portugal that the best response to ‘sour grapes’ on the part of ‘Latin’ nations was to wait out the row, but also to remind local journalists that FIFA’s refereeing committee had consisted of representatives from Yugoslavia, Spain, the USSR, Switzerland, Malaysia and the UK.​[58]​ If an Anglo-centric predisposition had existed, it was probably unintentional, but still unfortunate.  In some countries, notably Chile and Paraguay, local sentiment was reported to be more sympathetic to the English than the Argentines.​[59]​  As with Argentina, British relations with Bolivia, Chile and Peru mattered because Britain still had some investment links there such as the Antofagasta railway in Chile.​[60]​
There was one country in Latin America where diplomats recorded a positive response, El Salvador.  There, Geoffrey Kirk of the British Embassy had noted that England winning the World Cup would be a great ‘filip’ to Britain’s prestige.  Over-generalizing the El Salvadorians to some degree, he claimed the footballing public were ‘practically coterminous’ with the public as a whole.  Salvadorians apparently felt that the English had been the best team in the competition, worthy of winning, and Kirk noted that while Salvadorians did not feel solidarity for their fellow Latin Americans, this development may ‘indicate an increasing discrimination.’​[61]​


Longer-term impact of 1966
With the decline of formal and informal empire together with Britain’s expectations of maintaining its global influence, the 1960s is an interesting period to study the interplay between Britain’s social and economic status and the politics of football. Britain had hoped to return to global predominance in some form after the Second World War but in terms of economic growth the country found itself lagging behind the rest of Western Europe as well as Japan.  Domestic industry, itself founded to some extent on exports to formal Empire as well as Latin America, performed relatively weakly and Britain struggled to support Sterling as a reserve currency, in a series of crises which culminated in the humiliating 1967 devaluation. In a political sense Britain was forced to admit that it had overstretched its capabilities, and in a bid to save the country’s export industries took the always controversial step towards EEC membership. Formal Empire had been evaporating in a series of independence struggles since the Second World War, including the short lived attempt to create a West Indies Federation out of the British colonies in the Caribbean, which collapsed when Jamaica broke away in 1962​[62]​. Britain’s economic ties with Latin America were almost the first casualties of the disintegration of Sterling after 1945. Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil were forced to compensate for the collapsing value of Sterling against the US Dollar by pressuring Britain to liquidate debts built up in exchange for foodstuffs during the war.  As well as nationalising the railways in exchange for meat exports to the UK in 1947, Perón actively directed the Argentine meat and grain industries towards other European countries, while Uruguay and Brazil both traded British war balances for the nationalization of assets, including railways and tramways. By the 1950s the only real British holdings of any value left in Latin America were the branch network of the Bank of London and South America and the subsidiaries of multinationals such as Shell.​[63]​
The 1966 FIFA World Cup, was therefore a defining event in the histories of soccer and society as the British still held high positions in the hierarchy of FIFA as well as the International Football Association Board (IFAB), the body which oversees the rules of the game.  In this paper we have analysed the ways in which the 1966 FIFA World Cup was perceived in Latin America.  Findings reveal that although the tournament was a successful enterprise for the British and its government in the short term domestically, it was not universally successful in building Britain’s image abroad, particularly in areas formally considered as falling under British influence in Latin America.  The disturbances and resulting diplomatic controversies around the 1966 tournament may superficially appear to have been a temporary phenomenon, but longer-term damage had been done to the standing, not just of the English Football Association, but also the three other British associations, with which the English had behaved as a bloc, perhaps most significantly in IFAB. 
The British soccer establishment reacted with consternation when Havelange was elected to the FIFA Presidency over Rous in 1974.  Havelange extended soccer’s reach in the global south, addressing the frustrations of African and Asian countries at their lack of representation in the World Cup, diluting the influence of the Western Hemisphere on FIFA.
	Since 1966 tensions between the UK and Latin America have persisted.  During the run up to the 1970 World Cup in Mexico, when England were still World Champions, their captain Bobby Moore was controversially arrested for shoplifting in Columbia.  He was released only after the intervention of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and never prosecuted, finally being cleared in 1972, but the arrest was portrayed by the British press as an attempt to derail England’s preparations for the world cup and possibly to extort money from the team.​[64]​  A more persistent flashpoint has been the ownership of the Falklands Islands; In the lead up to the 1982 FIFA World Cup, which coincided with the war between Britain and Argentina over the islands (known as Las Malvinas to Argentinians), the Argentine World Cup squad posed with a banner bearing the legend Las Malvinas Son Argentinas (The Malvinas are Argentine).  The Argentine FA renamed one of the country’s domestic tournaments ‘Sovereignty over the Malvinas’, and the country’s most famous radio commentator refused to call England players by name when covering their matches, instead referring to players by their shirt colour.​[65]​ In the 1986 World Cup, held in Mexico, in what became known as the ‘Hand of God’ incident, Argentina’s captain Diego Maradona handled the ball into the net in a quarter final against England, but the referee allowed the goal to stand, Argentina winning 2-1. The boot was now on the other foot in terms of controversy.  As recently as 2014 the Argentina team again displayed a Las Malvinas Son Argentinas banner, an act viewed by FIFA to infringe its rules on political action and team misconduct.​[66]​
	Such controversies have endured in the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The Brazilian player Neymar attracted criticism for the frequency with which he fell to the ground when challenged by opposing players, whilst other Latin American teams were criticised on the basis of their rough play.  Two of the most high profile examples involving England included Panama and Columbia – while England won both of these games, television coverage evidenced England players being held, pushed and wrestled to the ground.  However, tensions had been raised by prior coverage in the English newspapers: The Sun punned on the name of England’s captain Harry Kane and stereotypes of the Columbian drug trade with the headline ‘as 3 Lions face nation that gave world Shakira, great coffee, and er, other stuff, we say..GO KANE!’. The Columbian broadcaster Caracol reported on its website that the headline ‘caused great upset’ to Columbians, while the Columbian ambassador to the UK proclaimed ‘its rather sad that they use such a festive and friendly environment as the World Cup to target a country and continue to stigmatise it with a completely unrelated issue’. The Sun responded that they hoped the headline would boost the Columbian coffee industry!​[67]​  These exchanges typified a tit-for-tat mentality surrounding international relations at the World Cup – the Columbians accused the referee of bias towards England and were supported by Diego Maradona who claimed that England committed a ‘monumental robbery’ by winning the game. Prior to the tournament, at the draw former England striker Gary Lineker, a veteran of the ‘Hand of God’ match, quipped that Maradona had always been good with his hands.​[68]​
	Since the 1966 World Cup the relationship between British and Latin American football has been characterized by tit-for-tat exchanges through the media and diplomatic services, as well as controversial events on and off the pitch.  We therefore assert that the 1966 World Cup brought to the boil tensions that have sustained to the present.  Despite these tensions the exotic image of the skilful Latin American player has persisted, evidenced by the positive reception given to the arrival of players in the UK from the 1970s onwards, who were usually brought in to provide flair and creativity to augment the British teams. For example, OssieArdiles and Ricky Villa arrived from Argentina and quickly made a positive impression.  The first Brazilian, Mirandinha, signed for Newcastle in 1987, opening the gateway for JuninhoPaulista and others in the 1990s as the Premier League era got under way and the English professional league clubs increasingly recruited from abroad.   In 2015 the Daily Telegraph published an article headlined ‘Why South American strikers are the best of the Premier League’, summarising the reasons as ‘desire’, ‘drive’, ‘passion’ and ‘fight’ – all familiar language although the classic ‘flair’ was missing.​[69]​  One player mentioned in the article, Luis Suarez certainly evidenced some of the aforementioned traits, receiving bans for biting opposing players while playing for Ajax in the Netherlands, Liverpool in England, and Uruguay in the 2014 World Cup.​[70]​These incidents were all widely reported in the media and sustained the stereotype of the aggressive Latin American footballer.

Conclusion
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